Smith v. Pelham by Northern District of Alabama
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
 
JENNIFER SMITH,    ] 
       ] 
 Plaintiff,     ] 
       ] 
v.       ]  2:17-cv-01320-ACA 
       ] 
CITY OF PELHAM, et al.,   ] 
       ] 
 Defendants.    ] 
  
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This matter comes before the court on Defendants City of Pelham and Larry 
Palmer’s motion to dismiss and/or motion for partial summary judgment on Counts 
Three, Four, and Five of the second amended complaint (doc. 60), and 
Mr. Palmer’s motion to dismiss Counts Three, Four, and Five of the second 
amended complaint (doc. 62).   
 Plaintiff Jennifer Smith was a city employee working in the Pelham Police 
Department.  Mr. Palmer, the Chief of Police, ordered a warrantless search of her 
work computer.  Unbeknownst to Ms. Smith, her work computer contained backup 
copies of her personal cell phone and, based at least in part on photographs found 
on those backups, Mr. Palmer suspended and later terminated Ms. Smith’s 
employment.  Ms. Smith filed suit, asserting various claims against both 
Mr. Palmer and the City of Pelham.  Of relevance to these motions, she claims that 
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Defendants (1) subjected her to an unconstitutional search of her personal 
cellphone, in violation of the Fourth Amendment (“Count Three”); (2) deprived 
her of due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count Four”); and 
(3) invaded her privacy, in violation of Alabama law (“Count Five”).  (Doc. 59 at –
63).  Defendants do not seek dismissal of or summary judgment on Counts One 
and Two, so the court will not discuss those claims. 
 Because Ms. Smith lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the backup copies of her cell phone, the court GRANTS summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants and against Ms. Smith on Count Three.  Because Defendants 
provided Ms. Smith with all the process she was due during her appeal of her 
termination, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants and 
against Ms. Smith on Count Four.  And because Defendants obtained only 
information that they properly accessed through Ms. Smith’s work computer, the 
court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Ms. Smith 
on Count Five. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A motion to dismiss constrains the court to consider, with limited 
exceptions, only the allegations made in the complaint, Butler v. Sheriff of Palm 
Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012), but a motion for summary 
judgment requires the court to consider evidence submitted by the parties, see 
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Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012).  
Setting out the facts in this case is complicated because the City of Pelham and 
Mr. Palmer moved both to dismiss and for summary judgment on Counts Three, 
Four, and Five.  (Doc. 60).  At the same time, Mr. Palmer also filed a separate 
motion to dismiss, asserting that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Counts 
Three and Four, and state agent immunity from Count Five.  (Doc. 62).  Although 
the court set out two separate briefing schedules (docs. 64, 65), Ms. Smith 
responded to both motions in one filing, adopting and incorporating by reference 
evidence that she had submitted to the court during an earlier round of motions 
practice.  (Doc. 67).   
For the sake of simplicity, and because the court concludes that it can 
resolve the claims against both defendants based on the joint motion for summary 
judgment, the court will use the summary judgment standard.  Accordingly, the 
court draws its description of the facts from the evidence, drawing all inferences 
and reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Smith.  See Hamilton, 
680 F.3d at 1318. 
The City of Pelham is a governmental municipal corporation in Shelby 
County, Alabama.  (Doc. 59 at 40 ¶ 207).  From November 2003 until October 
2015, Ms. Smith was the Executive Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Police 
of the City of Pelham, a position that made her a permanent employee in the City 
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of Pelham’s classified service.  (Id. at 4 ¶ 14, 40 ¶ 209, 51 ¶ 259, 53 ¶ 269).  
Mr. Palmer became the Chief of Police in March 2015.  (Doc. 13-1 at 2). 
 The City of Pelham has a “Civil Service Law Handbook,” which sets out 
“provisions with respect to appointment, career development, removal, discipline, 
and related conditions of employment in the classified service.”  (Doc. 13-7 at 1, 
3).  The Handbook provides that the Chief of Police is a Department Head and, as 
such, an “appointing authority.”  (Id. at 8–9).  Under the policies set out in the 
Handbook, an appointing authority may dismiss, demote, or suspend an employee 
within the classified service “for cause or for any reason deemed to be in the best 
interest of the public service.”  (Id. at 43).   Either before or on the date of the 
dismissal, the appointing authority must give the employee written notice of 
dismissal, including “[t]he cause of action,” the effective date of the dismissal, and 
“[a]ny other information deemed appropriate.”1  (Id. at 44).   
 A permanent employee may appeal a dismissal or suspension to the 
Personnel Board (doc. 13-7 at 45), which is tasked with reviewing, approving, 
disapproving, or modifying administrative actions (id. at 15).  On receipt of an 
appeal, the Board must hold a public hearing to determine whether the employee 
should be retained “or should be removed or otherwise disciplined.”  (Id. at 45).   
                                                          
1 The only provision in the Handbook about the requirements for suspension relates to 
suspension without pay.  (Doc. 13-7 at 44).  The record confirms that Ms. Smith’s suspension 
was with pay.  (Doc. 13-1 at 6; see also Doc. 37 at 8). 
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 In addition to the Handbook, the City of Pelham has a “Social Networking 
Policy,” which sets out guidelines for public employees’ use of social networking 
websites (doc. 13-3 at 2–3), and a “Computer/Email & Internet Use Policy” (the 
“Computer Policy”), which governs employees’ use of the City’s computer 
systems (doc. 13-5 at 2–4).  The Computer Policy provides in relevant part: 
 All software, programs, applications, templates, data and data 
files residing on computer systems or storage media or developed on 
the city’s systems are property of the City of Pelham . . . .  The City of 
Pelham, therefore, may access, copy, change, alter, modify, destroy, 
delete or erase this property.   
 
(Doc. 13-5 at 2–3). 
 From as early as 2007, Ms. Smith and Mr. Palmer clashed.  (Doc. 59 at 5–6; 
Doc. 37-1 at 6–7).  Ms. Smith filed complaints against Mr. Palmer before he 
became the Chief of Police in March 2015.  (Doc. 37-3 at 17–18).  For his part, 
Mr. Palmer attested that shortly after he became the Chief of Police, he began to 
suspect that Ms. Smith was performing work for her secondary employer while on 
the clock at the Police Department and that she was misusing her sick and leave 
time.  (Doc. 13-1 at 2–3).  He also asserts that he received complaints about 
Ms. Smith’s activity on Facebook.  (Id. at 3–4).  As a result, he states, on an 
undisclosed date, he ordered an investigation into Ms. Smith’s use of social 
networking sites and leave time.  (Id. at 4). 
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 Around the same time, Mr. Palmer denied one of Ms. Smith’s requests to 
use her compensation time.  (Doc. 37-1 at 3).  Based on that denial, on September 
2, 2015, she filed with the City of Pelham Human Resources Department a 
complaint of sex discrimination against Mr. Palmer.  (Id.).  Mr. Palmer received 
notification of the complaint on the same day.  (Id.).   
 Eight days later, on September 10, 2015, Mr. Palmer ordered Detective 
Patrick McGill to review Ms. Smith’s work computer.  (Doc. 13-1 at 5; Doc. 37-3 
at 20).  Two dayslater, Detective McGill imaged her computer and found backup 
copies of Ms. Smith’s personal cell phone.  (Doc. 37-3 at 20–21).  Those backup 
copies contained nude photographs of Ms. Smith and other people.  (Id. at 21).  
Detective McGill testified that the only way the computer could have backed up 
Ms. Smith’s cell phone was if she had plugged her phone into her computer.  (Id. at 
21–22). Ms. Smith later testified that she had connected her cell phone to her 
computer for work purposes, but she had not known that the computer would make 
backup copies of her phone.  (Doc. 37-3 at 29–31, 113; see also Doc. 59 at 44 
¶ 228).  The backup copies were accessible to anyone on the City network with 
administrator privileges.  (Doc. 37-3 at 131–33).   
 On September 24, 2018, Mr. Palmer met with Ms. Smith and Human 
Resources Director Janis Parks.  (Doc. 37-1 at 5).  At the meeting, he informed 
Ms. Smith that he was placing her on administrative leave with pay pending 
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completion of an internal investigation.  (Id.; Doc. 13-1 at 6).   On October 1, 
2015, Mr. Palmer held another meeting with Ms. Smith and Ms. Parks.  (Doc. 37-1 
at 5; Doc. 13-1 at 6).  At that meeting, he offered her the opportunity to resign and 
“not face these circumstances,” but she apparently declined to resign.  (See Doc. 
37-3 at 14).  As a result, Mr. Palmer “verbally terminated [her] from the City of 
Pelham Police Department effective that day, October 1, 2015, for violation of the 
Internet policy and conduct unbecoming of an employee.”  (Doc. 37-1 at 5–6).  
Mr. Palmer did not give her any other information about the reasons for her 
termination.2  (Id. at 6). 
 At some point after the meeting, Mr. Palmer drafted a Disciplinary Action 
Notification identifying the reasons for termination, which he dated October 1, 
2015.  (Doc. 13-1 at 7; Doc. 13-6 at 2).  The Notification states that Mr. Palmer 
recommended and approved the recommendation to dismiss Ms. Smith for conduct 
unbecoming an employee in the public service and violation of the Social 
Networking and Computer Policies.  (Doc. 13-6 at 2–3).  The Notification includes 
a handwritten note by Mr. Palmer that the “[f]orm was completed after an initial 
meeting with [Ms. Smith].”  (Id. at 3).  Although Mr. Palmer signed the form, 
Ms. Smith did not.  (Id.).   
                                                          
2 Although Mr. Palmer disputes Ms. Smith’s testimony that he did not give her any 
information about the investigation at either the September 24 or the October 1 meeting, at this 
stage the court must accept Ms. Smith’s testimony about what Mr. Palmer told her.  See 
Hamilton, 680 F.3d at 1318. 
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The parties have not pointed to evidence in the record establishing when 
Mr. Palmer or the City gave Ms. Smith a copy of the Notification, but according to 
her second amended complaint, she did not receive the Notification until October 
15, 2015, after she filed an appeal of her termination.  (Doc. 59 at 54 ¶ 273).  
Before the hearing, Ms. Smith requested copies of her personnel file and all 
documents relating to her termination, but Human Resources Director Janis Parks 
provided only excerpts of her personnel file.  (Doc. 37-1 at 9; Doc. 59 at 55 
¶¶ 277–78). 
The Personnel Board held a hearing on October 28, 2015.  (Doc. 37-3 at 2).  
Ms. Smith was represented by counsel, who was allowed to question witnesses, 
including Ms. Smith, Mr. Palmer, and Detective McGill.  (See generally Doc. 37-
3).  During the hearing, Mr. Palmer acted hostile toward Ms. Smith and her 
attorney.  (Doc. 37-1 at 11; Doc. 37-3 at 17, 66).  In addition, Ms. Smith asserts 
that the Personnel Board did not allow her attorney to pursue a line of questioning 
about her complaint of discrimination against Mr. Palmer.  (Doc. 67 at 18; see 
Doc. 37-3 at 18–19, 51–53).  But the record shows that the Board questioned 
Ms. Parks, the Department’s Human Resources Director, about that complaint at 
length, and Ms. Smith’s attorney was able to draw the Board’s attention to the 
temporal proximity between Ms. Smith’s complaint of discrimination and 
Mr. Palmer’s order to search her work computer.  (Doc. 37-3 at 100–11).   
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On November 5, 2015, Ms. Parks sent Ms. Smith a letter stating that the 
Personnel Board had affirmed her dismissal because it was “of the opinion that 
substantial evidence supports the City’s dismissal decision.”  (Doc. 13-8 at 2).  
The Civil Service Law Handbook provides that “[t]he decision of the Board . . . 
shall be final subject to appeal by either party to the Circuit Court to review 
questions and whether or not the decision or order of the Board is supported by 
substantial evidence legally received by the Board.”  (Doc. 13-7 at 48).  
Defendants contend that Ms. Smith did not appeal the Board’s decision (doc. 61 at 
17), and Ms. Smith has not controverted that assertion. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The City and Mr. Palmer seek summary judgment on Counts Three, Four, 
and Five—Ms. Smith’s claims that they subjected her to an unconstitutional search 
(Count Three), deprived her of due process (Count Four), and invaded her privacy 
(Count Five).  (Docs. 60, 62).  The court will address each count separately. 
1. Count Three (Fourth Amendment Claim) 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that people shall “be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  “The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures protects an individual in those places where 
[she] can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy against government 
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intrusion.”  United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation 
marks omitted).  The Amendment applies “without regard to whether the 
government actor is investigating crime or performing another function,” including 
acting as an employer.  City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010).  
An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy only if she can 
establish both a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search and 
“that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” the expectation of privacy.  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  And if an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, she cannot challenge the search.  Id.; see also Presley v. United States, 
895 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[S]tanding under the Fourth Amendment is 
not jurisdictional; instead, we analyze it as a merits issue.”).   
The City and Mr. Palmer assert that Ms. Smith had no subjective expectation 
of privacy because the City’s Computer Policy provided that the City had a right to 
monitor all users of City computing systems.  (Doc. 61 at 10–12).  Alternatively, 
they argue that the search was objectively reasonable because Mr. Palmer was 
investigating whether Ms. Smith had violated City policies regulating leave time, 
social networking, and secondary employment.  (Id. at 13–14).   
Ms. Smith does not contend that she had an expectation of privacy in her 
work computer; instead, she “focuses, not on the examination of the contents of her 
business computer, but the further intrusion into the contents of what Defendants 
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knew was Smith’s personal cell phone.”  (Doc. 67 at 6).  She argues that her 
employer would not be permitted to conduct a warrantless search of her cell phone 
merely because it was located in her work office, so it could not search the 
electronic copy of her cell phone merely because it was saved on her work 
computer.  (Id. at 7–9).  Ms. Smith’s position is unavailing. 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that a person lacks an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in computer files that he inadvertently shared over a 
computer network.  United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007).  
In King, the criminal defendant—a civilian contractor for the military—connected 
his personal laptop to a governmental network, exposing his hard drive to anyone 
who had access to the network.  Id. at 1339–40.  Although the defendant believed 
that he had protected his files using security settings, an airman using the network 
found pornographic files and reported that discovery to a military investigator, 
leading to a search of the laptop computer and hard drive through the network.  Id. 
at 1340–41.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that, just as people do not have an 
objective expectation of privacy in common areas of a multi-unit apartment 
building or a dumpster accessible to the public, a person does not have an objective 
expectation of privacy in files accessible through a network where “the military 
authorities encountered the files without employing any special means or intruding 
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into any area which [the defendant] could reasonably expect would remain 
private.”  Id. at 1341–42.   
 The King decision controls the outcome of this claim.  Even assuming that 
Ms. Smith had a subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 
her cell phone, she did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the content of her work computer, which included the backup copies of her 
personal phone.  The City’s Computer Policy provided that “[t]he City of 
Pelham . . . may access, copy, change, alter, modify, destroy, delete or erase [all 
data and data files residing on City computer systems or storage media].”  (Doc. 
13-5 at 2–3).  Ms. Smith testified that she was aware of that policy.  (Doc. 37-3 at 
35). 
The fact that Ms. Smith did not know that connecting her phone to her 
computer would cause the computer to back up the contents of the phone does not 
alter the analysis.  In King, the defendant erroneously believed the files contained 
on his personal computer were protected by security safeguards.  King, 509 F.3d at 
1341.  Nevertheless, he lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in the files on 
his computer once he connected them to a network by which others could access 
them “without employing any special means or intruding into any area which [the 
defendant] could reasonably expect would remain private.”  Id. at 1342.  In this 
case, Ms. Smith did not know that connecting her phone to her work computer 
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would cause the computer to save a copy of her phone.  Nevertheless, once the 
computer backed up her cell phone, the previously private data became accessible 
to her employer “without employing any special means or intruding into any area 
which [Ms. Smith] could reasonably expect would remain private.”  Id.  It was 
saved on a City computer that was connected to a City network, and Detective 
McGill testified that anyone with administrative access to the network could access 
the cell phone back ups.  (Doc. 37-3 at 123, 131–33). 
Given that Ms. Smith lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information contained on her work computer, including the backup of her personal 
cell phone, the court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on Count Three 
in favor of Defendants and against Ms. Smith.     
 2. Count Four (Fourteenth Amendment Claim) 
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  A procedural due process claim “requires 
proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or 
property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”  
Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).  In addition, “the state 
may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later procedural remedy; only 
when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural 
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deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983 arise.”  
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).   
 The City and Mr. Palmer do not dispute that Ms. Smith had a protected 
property interest in her employment with the City of Pelham or that her termination 
constituted state action.  (See Doc. 61 at 14–18).  Instead, they argue that she 
received constitutionally adequate process before her termination.  (Id.).  
Ms. Smith responds that she did not receive adequate process before either her 
suspension or her termination.  (Doc. 67 at 17–19).   
 As an initial matter, to the extent Ms. Smith’s claim relates to Defendants’ 
failure to comply with the City’s own requirements before suspending an 
employee, an employer’s failure to comply with its own rules does not, by itself, 
amount to a deprivation of due process.  See Smith v. Georgia, 684 F.2d 729, 733 
n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[N]ot every violation by a state agency of its own rules rises 
to the level of a due process infringement.”); see also Yarbrough v. Decatur Hous. 
Auth., 905 F.3d 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018) (William Pryor, J., concurring) 
(“Under our precedents, an agency’s failure to follow its own procedural 
regulations gives rise to a due process violation only if the procedures the agency 
actually applied in lieu of those required by its regulations failed to provide what 
the Due Process Clause itself requires: notice and an opportunity to be heard.”) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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 And Ms. Smith’s claim that Defendants’ failure to provide a pre-suspension 
hearing constituted a due process violation fails.  Neither the Supreme Court nor 
the Eleventh Circuit has held that a public employee is entitled to a pre-suspension 
hearing, especially where the suspension is with pay, as Ms. Smith’s suspension 
was.  (Doc. 13-1 at 6; see also Doc. 37 at 8).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
indicated in dicta that no hearing is necessary where the employer suspends the 
employee with pay.  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 544–45 
(1985) (footnote omitted) (“[I]n those situations where the employer perceives a 
significant hazard in keeping the employee on the job, it can avoid the problem by 
suspending with pay.”); cf. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (rejecting a 
categorical rule that a government employer may not suspend an employee without 
pay absent a pre-suspension hearing). 
 So Ms. Smith’s claim must rest on the termination.  She takes issue with 
both the termination itself and her appeal of the termination to the Personnel 
Board.  (Doc. 67 at 17–19).  Specifically, she argues that Defendants deprived her 
of due process because (1) Mr. Palmer terminated her on October 1 without 
providing her a hearing or a written statement of reasons; (2) the City refused to 
provide her with all the evidence she requested in preparation for her appeal to the 
Personnel Board and considered sealed evidence that it did not give to her; (3) the 
Personnel Board did not allow Ms. Smith to explore her allegation that the 
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termination was pretext for sex discrimination; and (4) the Personnel Board 
allowed Mr. Palmer’s outbursts during the hearing.  (Doc. 67 at 17–19).  The court 
will address only the procedural adequacy of the appeal before the Personnel 
Board because, even assuming Mr. Palmer’s “verbal termination” on October 1 
deprived Ms. Smith of due process, the post-termination appeal process cured the 
violation.  See McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557.   
Before a governmental employer may discharge an employee, that employer 
must provide “some kind of a hearing,” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 532, 542 (1985), which can be “something less than a full evidentiary 
hearing” but must include “oral or written notice of the charges against [the 
employee], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to 
present [the employee’s] side of the story,” id. at 545–46.  “That hearing is not a 
mini-trial and ‘need not definitely resolve the propriety of the discharge.  It should 
be an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of 
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the 
employee are true and support the proposed action.’”  McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1561 
(quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545–46). 
 Either at or before the hearing, the City provided Ms. Smith with a copy of 
the Disciplinary Action Notification (doc. 59 at 54 ¶ 273), which informed 
Ms. Smith of the grounds on which her termination rested (doc. 13-6 at 2).  At the 
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hearing, Ms. Smith’s attorneys and the members of the Board questioned 
Mr. Palmer, Ms. Smith, Detective McGill, and other witnesses about the proffered 
grounds for her termination.  (See generally Doc. 37-3).  Ms. Smith was given an 
opportunity to explain her Facebook posts, the pictures on her work computer, and 
other evidence that Mr. Palmer and City relied on in concluding that she was 
working for a secondary employer while on the clock at the Police Department.  
(Id.).  The hearing provided by the Personnel Board satisfied the requirements of 
due process: it provided her notice of the charges against her, an explanation of the 
employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present her side of the story.  
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545–46.   
 As for Ms. Smith’s challenge to the Board’s failure to provide her with all of 
the evidence she requested, nothing in Loudermill requires the employer to provide 
the employee with all of the evidence she requests.  Cf id. at 545 (requiring only 
“an explanation of the employer’s evidence”) (emphasis added).  Ms. Smith also 
asserts that the Board did not allow her to pursue her allegation that the termination 
was pretext for retaliation, but the record belies that assertion.  The Board 
considered evidence about the temporal proximity between Ms. Smith’s complaint 
against Mr. Palmer and Mr. Palmer’s order to search Ms. Smith’s work computer.  
(See Doc. 37-3 at 100–11).   
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Finally, to the extent Ms. Smith argues that the Personnel Board was biased 
and therefore deprived her of due process because it allowed Mr. Palmer’s 
outbursts against her, her claim fails because she could have appealed the Board’s 
decision to the state circuit court.  “[E]ven if a plaintiff suffered a procedural 
deprivation at [her] administrative hearing, there is no procedural due process 
violation if the state makes available a means to remedy the deprivation.”  Laskar 
v. Peterson, 771 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014).  The undisputed evidence 
shows that the City’s Civil Service Law Handbook provides that the Personnel 
Board’s decision is “subject to appeal by either party to the Circuit Court to review 
questions and whether or not the decision or order of the Board is supported by 
substantial evidence legally received by the Board.”  (Doc. 13-7 at 48).  
Accordingly, even if the Personnel Board was biased, the State’s provision of an 
appeal process through the circuit court provided adequate process to cure any 
deprivation of due process that occurred during Ms. Smith’s hearing.  McKinney, 
20 F.3d at 1562 (“The state is obligated only to make available the means by which 
the employee can receive redress for the deprivations.”) (alteration and quotation 
marks omitted).   
 Because Ms. Smith received adequate process after her termination, the 
court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendants and 
against Ms. Smith. 
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 3. Count Five (Invasion of Privacy Claim) 
Under Alabama law, a plaintiff asserting a wrongful-intrusion invasion of 
privacy claim must demonstrate that the defendant intruded into the plaintiff’s 
“private activities in such manner so as to outrage or to cause mental suffering, 
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”  Hogin v. Cottingham, 
533 So. 2d 525, 530 (Ala. 1988) (quotation marks omitted).  The Alabama 
Supreme Court has indicated that where a police chief published a letter making 
allegations about an employee’s work ethic, the chief had not invaded the 
employee’s privacy because he had not “intruded upon her ‘physical solitude or 
seclusion’ by seeking any information that he did not properly have access to 
through his role as her supervisor in the police department.”  Gary v. Crouch, 867 
So. 2d 310, 318 (Ala. 2003). 
In Ms. Smith’s second amended complaint she sought both compensatory 
and punitive damages (id. at 63), but in her response to the motion for summary 
judgment, she withdraws her request for punitive damages (doc. 67 at 21), leaving 
only her request for compensatory damages.  Defendants contend that they are 
entitled to summary judgment on the invasion of privacy claim because they 
obtained only information that Mr. Palmer appropriately accessed as Ms. Smith’s 
supervisor, and because she consented to the search of her work computer under 
the Computer Policy.  (Doc. 61 at 24).  Ms. Smith responds that her consent to 
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search the computer did not extend to searching her personal cell phone.  (Doc. 67 
at 14–15).   
As the court discussed above, Ms. Smith was aware of the City’s Computer 
Policy and consented to any search of her work computer.  The fact that she did not 
know connecting her cell phone to her computer would result in personal 
photographs being saved on the City’s network does not save her claim.  
Defendants accessed only her work computer; they did not intrude anywhere they 
were not allowed to access.  Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion for 
summary judgment on Count Five.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 The court GRANTS the motion for partial summary judgment and 
ENTERS SUMMARY JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants and against 
Ms. Smith on Counts Three, Four, and Five.  (Doc. 60).  The court DENIES AS 
MOOT Mr. Palmer’s motion to dismiss.  (Doc. 62).  The court DIRECTS the 
Clerk to term Mr. Palmer as a defendant. 
 Counts One and Two remain and will proceed to discovery. 




      _________________________________ 
      ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON 
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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